“The strongest military in the Middle East and the strongest military in the world fought together, shoulder by shoulder, side by side against a nation that was under 47 years of sanctions, and failed to achieve their objectives.”
“This will have repercussion for the next 10 and 20 years, and will mark the beginning of the decline of the US Empire.”
These were two of the key assessments that strategic analyst Elijah Magnier shared during the hour-long conversation that Just World Ed president Helena Cobban conducted with him May 29, just about three months after the fateful day, February 28, on which the U.S. and Israel launched their large-scale, and still continuing, assault on Iran.
This conversation was #23 in Just World Ed’s ongoing project on the Iran Crisis. Catch the full audio record on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Or download the transcript here. The video will be available shortly on our Youtube channel.
Elijah Magnier had been Ms. Cobban’s very first guest when JWE launched this project, back on February 25. They used their latest conversation to assess how the current U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, and the wider cascade of fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, have altered the strategic landscape across West Asia and beyond. Their discussion portrayed the outcome of the conflict thus far as constituting a turning point that has exposed limits in U.S. and Israeli power while accelerating regional realignments, especially among Iran, the Gulf Arab states, Pakistan, and China.
The conversation centered first on the ceasefire or “framework” now being discussed between Washington and Tehran. Mr. Magnier argued that it is too unstable to be trusted, describing it as negotiable paper rather than a durable agreement. He said the core problem is that Donald Trump cannot be relied upon to keep a consistent position, while Israel continues to act with impunity in Lebanon and Gaza. Ms. Cobban asked whether whether any de-escalation could be sustained since previous agreements have repeatedly been broken, and whether Trump would actually restrain Benjamin Netanyahu.
Mr. Magnier’s answer was blunt: he said he does not believe a final deal will be signed while Trump remains in power. He noted that the United States and Israel have repeatedly violated ceasefires, including in Gaza and Lebanon, and that this pattern makes promises of peace largely meaningless. His clear understanding of the text of the draft framework now being considered is that it will only go into operation if the war stops on all fronts, especially in Lebanon; otherwise, there is no real deal at all. He framed the crisis as a trust deficit so deep that diplomacy cannot proceed on conventional assumptions.
A major theme of the conversation was Iranian resilience. Mr. Magnier said Iran’s objective was never conquest, but survival and self-defense, especially after it was attacked so unlawfully. He argued that Iran’s decentralized command structure, built over years of planning, allowed it to absorb heavy losses while maintaining the ability to retaliate quickly– “within 18 minutes!”– and continue operating. He said the attacks on Iranian commanders did not break the system, because Iran had deliberately designed redundancy into its military and political structure. Ms. Cobban noted that Iran’s establishment of built-in survivability and resilience had been greatly underestimated in the West.
The two also discussed the military consequences of the conflict. They noted that Iran’s response had destroyed or degraded U.S. bases and expensive radar/defense systems across the Gulf, forcing the Americans to move many of their remaining assets further to the west. Mr. Magnier described that outcome as a major operational setback that damaged U.S. capacity and the credibility of promises about providing a strategic shield to host-countries in the Gulf, without eliminating U.S. power altogether. He argued that Washington had failed to achieve its declared aims while inflicting pain on itself, its allies, and the global economy. Ms. Cobban concurred, noting that the war seemed to have pushed the United States and Israel onto the back foot, though not out of the region entirely.
On Hezbollah, the conversation highlighted what both speakers saw as a profound misreading by Israel and U.S. commentators. Ms. Cobban noted that many Western commentators had assumed Hezbollah was very badly weakened after the “pager attack” and the large Israeli assaults of late 2024, but instead the organization had reorganized and adapted. She pointed to the emergence of FPV drones and other capabilities that have inflicted losses on Israeli forces and undermined assumptions of Israeli military dominance. Mr. Magnier judged that Hezbollah’s goal is not to defeat Israel outright, but to make sure Israel pays a price for occupying Lebanese territory and attacking civilians.
The regional balance of power was another central concern. Mr. Magnier argued that the war has shown Gulf states that it is dangerous to rely solely on the United States. He said countries in the region are being pushed to diversify their partnerships, including toward Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and China. He also said the conflict is accelerating a broader decline in U.S. influence, not just militarily but economically, as more countries turn toward de-dollarization and stronger ties with Beijing. Ms. Cobban added that Saudi Arabia’s caution and the Gulf states’ different responses reflect a wider strategic recalibration.
Turning to China’s role, Mr. Magnier judged that it has had both immediate and long term effects. He said Beijing is closely watching how the United States fights and how Iran responds, because the war offers a live test of American resolve, vulnerabilities, and military style. He suggested that China has drawn the lesson that the U.S. cannot easily win against a determined opponent. At the same time, he said China does not need direct confrontation and will instead support partners like Iran so long as they remain capable of resisting U.S. pressure.
The conversation ended with Mr. Magnier warning the war has created consequences that will last for years, if not decades, and that it marks the start of a larger decline in U.S. power and regional dominance. He stressed that the conflict has redrawn assumptions about deterrence, alliance reliability, and the practical limits of military force. In his view, the war has not ended with a clear victory for anyone, but it has exposed the vulnerability of the United States and Israel, strengthened resistance actors’ confidence, and accelerated a shift in the balance of power both across West Asia and worldwide.